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Abstract
Wearable devices have become more common for
the average consumer. As devices need to operate
with low power, many devices use simplified security
measures to secure the data during transmission.
While Bluetooth, the primary method of
communication, includes certain security measures
as part of the format, they are insufficient to fully
secure the connection and the data transmitted.
Users must be made aware of the potential security
threats to the information communicated by the
wearable, as well as be empowered and engaged to
protect it. In this paper, we propose a method of
identifying
insecure
environments
through
crowdsourced data, allowing wearable consumers to
deploy an application on their base system (e.g., a
smart phone) that alerts when in the presence of a
security threat. We examine two different machine
learning methods for classifying the environment and
interacting with the users, as well as evaluating the
potential uses for both algorithms.

1. Introduction
There has been a marked increase in the demand
for wearable devices by the average consumer, from
fitness bands and blood pressure monitors to sweat
sensors and headphones. These devices communicate
through Bluetooth to a base station, often a phone, to
transmit data. Their proliferation by a multitude of
companies and the speed at which they are entering
the market means that security mechanisms may be
deferred to later product releases. The lack of security
consideration means these devices and/or their
connections are more likely to be attacked or have
data stolen.
The security of Bluetooth devices primarily relies
on attackers being unable to follow the
communication pattern. However, if an attacker can
capture the initial pairing messages between a
wearable and its base station, they may be able to
follow the full hop pattern. The pairing packets also
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include the keys used to decrypt additional data
packets, if the devices use encryption. Acquiring the
keys allows hackers to intercept all data
communication, assuming they can get the hop
pattern. Ryan [12] was able to overcome this
constraint, showing that the encryption that Bluetooth
uses can be bypassed nearly instantly and that the hop
pattern could be calculated with only minimal
packets intercepted by chance.
Consumers are largely unaware of security risks,
widely adopting a somewhat childish “If I can’t see
you, you can’t see me” approach to securing their
information [6]. This inattention becomes a much
larger problem when data is being transmitted via
Bluetooth. Most Bluetooth devices use only the
security measures already in the specification itself,
such as the default encryption and the rapid change of
communication frequency. However, there are
mechanisms that can sniff Bluetooth packets and
provide a method for man-in-the-middle and denial
of service attacks. [12].
Because wearables collect significant amounts of
data, from accelerometer data to medical information
such as heartrate, they can provide an attacker with
very detailed information about the wearer. For
instance, it has been shown that accelerometer data
generated by hand movements as captured by a
wearable (e.g., a smart bracelet or watch), could be
intercepted by an attacker and potentially calculate a
user’s PIN [16]. Because of the possibility of
intercepting Bluetooth communication, it is
increasingly important to have a method to prevent
data leakage. Ideally, new security mechanisms
should be compatible with existing Bluetooth
devices, as well as become deployable on future
devices.
As there are large numbers of Bluetooth devices
currently in the hands of consumers, with 3 billion
being sold in 2014 [1], there exists the potential to
use crowdsourcing techniques to collect obfuscated
user data. This data can provide researchers with the
ability to discover patterns based on wearable usage
given the basic information that the devices already
collect. When dealing with large datasets, machine
learning is often used to discover patterns quickly
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and effectively. Utilizing such techniques could lead
to a greater understanding of user environments and
the ability to adapt to unexpected security concerns
of new environments.
We previously investigated methodologies to
secure wearable connections by preventing data from
being sent between devices when the devices are in
an insecure location [15]. This research involved
examining passive and active wearables and the
different ways in which they submit data to the
associated base station. Given the differences, we
determined that the best overall method was to force
the wearable to send empty packets. To illustrate the
methodology, we deployed an iPhone app with
embedded
rules
for
pre-defined
insecure
environments, such as using the GPS coordinates of a
university office. This allowed us to ensure that, in a
potentially insecure environment, the app could
automatically cause the wearable to send empty
packets and not disconnect. The app deployed only
static rules, whose modification had to be performed
programmatically. While the manual construction
and deployment of such rules was not meant for a
wearable consumer, it did provide us with a means to
communicate with the wearable using this form of
technology.
In this paper, we expand on the original concept
of using an adaptive base station app, by exploring
the use of a cloud service and two machine learning
algorithms using data that is simulated as if
crowdsourced from users. One algorithm generates a
series of rules, allowing users to receive updated
rules automatically to adapt the app, and
consequently, their wearables, to recognize new,
potentially insecure situations as they are identified.
The second algorithm classifies ranges of sensors and
their combinations as potentially insecure in real-time
and can respond to an application’s query as to the
probability of the wearable information being
insecure. We detail the algorithms and their
integration with an extended app. We then evaluate
the benefits and disadvantages of each machine
learning algorithm, including how often they are
correct when given additional testing data.

2. Background
Existing Bluetooth security has been shown to be
lacking in many key areas. Ryan [12] created a
method to brute-force the key exchange protocol after
intercepting the pairing packets. This allowed him to
decrypt all additional communication sent between
the devices, illustrating a need for additional security

which relies on something beyond standard
encryption.
Diallo, et al. [4] attempted to secure the pairing
process by creating a table of trusted MAC addresses
for known devices which included a temporary
private key to encrypt only the pairing process.
Because this method requires both devices to keep
their own table, device manufacturers would have to
incorporate it into their design process. This method
is effective at securing all communication, though it
is unreasonable to expect manufacturers of Bluetooth
devices to universally adopt this strategy.
Two examples illustrate the need for wearable
security awareness. Pan, et al. [11] were able to
intercept and use data from a Bluetooth mouse to
recreate passwords input through an onscreen
keyboard. Wang, et al. [16] used the internal
accelerometer on a smart bracelet to recreate PINs
input at an ATM. Using Bluetooth keylogging and
password recreation in this way makes it impossible
to check if your information is being intercepted,
implying the need for embedding technology that can
stop wearable communications from being
intercepted.
Our previous work [15] investigated how this
security might be added by forcing Bluetooth devices
to send empty packets when in a pre-defined (static)
environment known by the base station to possibly be
insecure. This method relied on embedding static
rules which could not be modified by the user. This
investigation led us to the current research presented
in this paper in which we design a more robust
system by incorporating machine learning techniques
and by crowdsourcing data collection.
Machine learning algorithms have been shown to
achieve accuracy with relatively small datasets.
Moreno, et al. [10] were able to combine labels from
crowdsourced data with an accuracy of 89% or above
with datasets of only 500 labels and 200 users. This
method would allow us to discover new clusters as
they appear with relatively few reports of issues,
which is important for any security application.
Machine learning algorithms have been deployed
directly on wearables and smartphones. Lane, et al.
[8] examined four algorithms which used minimal
processing power to not adversely affect battery life.
They found that these algorithms were able to get
good results, but not as good as more processing
intensive algorithms which can be used when a
device is connected to the internet.
Parallelizing machine learning algorithms allows
for more powerful algorithms to be used. Chen, et al.
[3] showed that, when using a custom-designed
architecture for running neural networks on parallel
processors, they could achieve significant
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improvements in energy requirements and speed.
This method is ideal for a cloud-based service which
can be run on multiple servers or across multiple
processors more easily.
Crowdsourcing and machine learning go hand in
hand for many use cases. Because crowdsourcing can
deliver large quantities of data quickly and machine
learning can identify often unseen groupings in the
data, it is natural to combine the two. For example,
Minoda, et al. [9] used Amazon mTurk to collect
preferred lighting levels of images within a room
from a wide range of users of different ethnic
backgrounds. Their study was able to determine
estimated age and ethnicity of users based on their
responses. As another example, Saxe, et al. [13] used
code help forums, such as StackOverflow, to map
terms found in malware to train a machine learning
algorithm to detect the capabilities of specific
malware program. They were able to determine if a
specific piece of malware contained a given
capability, with approximately a 20% false positive
or false negative rate.
Crowdsourcing can also be used to improve
existing machine learning algorithms by identifying
where errors were made. Georgescu, et al. [5] used an
algorithm designed to identify important information
from academic papers, such as the author, title, and
abstract. They found that, despite the added process
of humans checking their work, they were unable to
get above 90% accuracy. This shows the need, when
crowdsourcing data, to understand that humans can
be flawed, which can lead to imperfections in the
data over which the machine learning algorithms are
applied.
Two independent researcher groups investigated
crowdsourcing users’ smart home preferences in an
attempt to improve the experience for all users.
Shahriar and Rahman [14] and Bourelos, et al. [2]
looked at energy management by crowdsourcing heat
sensors and environmental data to optimize heating
and cooling and minimize electricity used in homes.
Shahriar and Rahman used machine learning to
discover optimal clusters. Bourelos, et al. used an
algorithm that attempted to minimize each home’s
electrical requirements without compromising the
comfort of the users in the house.

3. Adapting Communication with the
Wearables
Bluetooth devices communicate using the
Adaptive Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum. This
method makes it difficult to intercept messages from
the devices, as the channel they are communicating

on changes after every packet. Hence, many
Bluetooth devices do not incorporate additional
forms of security. However, if an attacker is able to
follow the hop pattern, they can intercept all data sent
between the two devices.
When wearables pair with a base station, the
initial pairing packets are unencrypted, as they must
communicate with a device that has not received a
public key. This allows an attacker to gain
information stored in the pairing packets, such as the
hop pattern. Since the main packets are encrypted, it
is possible to obtain the key used to encrypt the keys
of both devices. Thus, an attacker can eavesdrop and
insert packets into the connection.
The issue is typically combatted by the devices
remaining paired so they do not send out additional
pairing packets. However, remaining paired does not
completely inhibit an attacker who has already
intercepted the initial pairing packets from
eavesdropping or inserting malicious packets. Our
experimental application forced a small set of
wearables to send empty data packets to an iPhone
when in environments that were pre-specified as
being insecure [15]. By sending empty data packets,
and subsequently halting all data requests made by
the phone, the devices maintained the connection,
disallowing an adversary to capture the pairing
information or obtain any information from
eavesdropping.
The original adaptive behavior was triggered only
when the device was in an environment that was
identified as insecure. The conditions defining an
insecure environment were predefined and statically
placed within the app to demonstrate its viability in
preventing an attacker from connecting to the device
themselves or eavesdropping on the packet
transmissions.
The
experimental
application
successfully prevented data from being sent between
the iPhone and selected devices, which included a
Metawear R, a Fitbit Charge HR, a Pebble Time
Round, and a pair of LG Tone Ultra Bluetooth
headphones. However, the application it was unable
to adapt to new potential threats or insecure
environments. These threats and environments had to
be manually inserted, which is impractical for
wearable consumers.
Validating the concept led to investigating a
system that would allow for adaptation “in-the-wild.”
There are multiple methods by which this adaption
could be accomplished. The simplest method is to
allow users to define rules from within the
application. This method relies on users being aware
of the security issues in their everyday lives and,
therefore, is likely not to be adopted. A more feasible
approach is to automatically adapt to the potentially
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changing environments that consumers may find
themselves in. In this paper, we apply machine
learning algorithms to snapshots that are
crowdsourced from security conscious users in order
to classify environments as being secure or insecure.

4. Insecure Environment Snapshot
Generation
To improve on our experimental application, we
focus on creating a system that can connect multiple
user experiences and learn what made specific
situations insecure. We incorporate a cloud service to
aggregate user input and machine learning algorithms
to predict if a situation is insecure or not.
To simulate crowdsourcing and evaluate our
learning algorithms, we create a service that
generates snapshots of sensor values representing an
insecure environment. The snapshots are passed to
the learning algorithms to represent users telling
other users that they believe the environment as
described by their sensor values to be insecure. The
concept is similar to WAZE, a community-based app
for traffic and navigation, where users communicate
to a cloud service regarding traffic delays and the
alternative routes they are taking. Similarly, the
snapshot generation allows the algorithms to learn
sensor ranges and combinations potentially related to
insecure situations that can then be communicated to
other users.

4.1. User defined snapshots
The application normally generates snapshots in 5
minute increments. The only exception to this timing
is if a user explicitly tells the app that they feel their
data may be insecure. At the time this action is taken,
the app will generate a snapshot explaining that it is
in an insecure environment, and will remain in this
state until the user tells the app they are again in a
secure environment.
Each snapshot is labeled as pertaining to a secure
or insecure environment at the time of generation.
This information can be used to both train the model
to improve its accuracy and evaluate the current
model’s effectiveness. The snapshots are stored
locally until the user is in a position where they can
upload the snapshots to the cloud service. Users may
choose to not send data when in an insecure
environment, as well as to only send data when their
device is connected to Wi-Fi to avoid using cellular
data. The cloud service stores snapshots from all
users who use the application. By crowdsourcing
their data, we aim to acquire a large number of data

points for each potentially insecure environment.
Users are not burdened with defining rules to secure
their devices. Additionally, users allow other security
conscious users to help define insecure conditions
and situations with just the press of a button.
{
"Devices": "Pebble",
"Heart Rate": "136.0",
"Time": "1377.0",
"Speed": "20.724903281615532",
"Latitude": "35.72388775811967",
"Longitude": "-95.94220940565249",
"Temperature": "4.9E-324",
"Insecure": "true"
}

Figure 1: Sample Snapshot
An example snapshot is depicted in Figure 1.
Note the value for temperature, which is used when a
Bluetooth device which provides that data is
unavailable. We have limited our snapshots to only
include data that can be taken from devices we have
access to. However, it is simple to add additional
variables to these parameters when new information
becomes available. In the case of the above snapshot,
the user has said that they are insecure in their current
situation, so the application is sending all available
data to attempt to learn the reason.
This approach relies heavily on a user with an
understanding
of
their
Bluetooth
device
communication safety, which may not always be
possible. We expect that a user of our application
initially will be security conscious enough to be fairly
accurate with their choice of secure/insecure
environments. As more users are added, the existing
rule base should help give those users an
understanding of secure and insecure environments,
allowing them to become more aware of their
wearable data security in their everyday lives.
By crowdsourcing, we are able to generate an
extensive list of potentially insecure environments.
To beat this system, an attacker could change
locations in order to set up in an environment that
may currently be considered secure. However, there
are other conditions that an attacker relies on that can
identify potential insecure environments, such as the
presence of public WiFi. Thus, if an attacker was to
relocate, application users eventually would begin
reporting this new environment as insecure, making
the move only a temporary solution for the attacker.

4.2. Automatic generation
To test our approach and to obtain sufficient
initial data for the machine learning algorithms, we
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needed to create a snapshot generator that takes a set
of basic insecure environments and generates a
significant number of snapshots, both secure and
insecure, with loosely clustered data points
representing insecure environments.
We defined insecure ranges for each variable. For
the purposes of this test, these variables had
consistent but somewhat arbitrary values. In a real
world situation, these values would be very carefully
controlled such that they mimic an actual known
insecure environment. The algorithm generates a
value for that variable. As some of the variables will
not always be available to the device, such as
temperature and heart rate, we only generate those
values in approximately 30% of the snapshots.
Next the algorithm checks if that value is within
the insecure range we had previously defined. If so,
the chance that the snapshot will be defined as
insecure increases. To better simulate human
interaction with the system, we include a base chance
that each snapshot that is generated is insecure. This
is a low value to allow for snapshots which have
values within the predefined secure ranges to be more
commonly defined as secure. The chance that a
snapshot is insecure can be modified prior to
generation as needed to better simulate real
environments or to force much clearer clustering.
For initial testing, automatic snapshot generation
was necessary to ensure there were enough data
points for evaluation in Section 6. Each algorithm
was trained on identical datasets generated in this
manner. However, automatic snapshot generation
also presents the possibility of introducing known
insecure situations by generating multiple copies of
the same insecure environment. This possibility can
lead to the rapid response of the system in the event
of a sudden and clear insecure environment.
As in the user generation of snapshots, each
snapshot includes a value if the snapshot is within a
secure environment.

5. Machine Learning
We investigated two different machine learning
algorithms to provide situational awareness with
respect to wearable data security. The first algorithm,
a rule-based approach, generates a tree from which
rules can be derived that dictate when the wearable
should send only empty packets. These rules can be
pushed to our application as periodic updates. This
method allows users to decide when their
applications are updated, an important consideration
for a phone application with limited data or service.
The second algorithm, a cloud-based approach,

performs machine learning using the Microsoft Azure
Machine Learning Studio. This method requires the
application to be in constant communication with the
server, since the application needs to send each
snapshot to the service to determine if it is in a safe
environment. We discuss in more detail the training
and results of these two methods in Section 6.

5.1. Rule-based Approach
For the rule-based approach, we created a web
service to collect data from multiple users into a
single repository comprised of snapshots of the
wearable sensors. These snapshots are used to train
the machine learning algorithm towards identifying
insecure environments. The web service also stores
the resulting rules, which are sent to devices to adapt
them to notify wearables when in an insecure setting.
The architecture of this method is shown in Figure 2.
We provide more of the programmatic details below.

Figure 2: Rule-Based Architecture
The web service was entirely written in-house in
Python, relying on a single R script to perform
statistical calculations on the data that has been saved
to disk. Our mobile app generates snapshots via user
input from presumably insecure environments, as
well as in known secure environments, which are sent
to the web service. The web service parses the
request and converts the resulting data into a single
CSV file to be used by the learning algorithm. This
method potentially limits the number of simultaneous
requests the service can currently accept, but the
bottleneck can be reduced by incorporating a
database which is periodically exported to a CSV file.
Using a single CSV file reduces the application
complexity as the file can be directly accessed by the
machine learning algorithm.
Once sufficient data has been collected, we train
the model using the full CSV file. After initial
training, if there are minimal requests by users for
updated rules or if there are not enough new
snapshots being generated, the learning algorithm
will suspend processing until a predefined threshold
is reached so that it can properly retrain and not
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introduce rules which may be temporary or may
lower the effectiveness of important rules.
When training the model, our web service calls an
R script to execute the Random Forest learning
algorithm given either the created CSV file or a CSV
file with training snapshots as input. The program
learns which label and range is able to predict an
insecure environment within the snapshots and uses
that to generate a conditional inference tree, or ctree
[7], as output. A ctree is a two-class decision tree
which partitions the data such that the leaf nodes of
the tree are the probability that the branch is insecure
and that each internal node describes the features of
the snapshot. The tree is created using a genetic
algorithm, set to terminate when the data can no
longer be subdivided. This allows us to generate rules
by simply reading the branches of the tree. For
numeric values choosing the left branch will result in
a rule which is less than or equal to that value, while
taking the right branch results in a rule which is
greater than the value. An example tree can be seen
in Figure 3. Note in this tree, the node labeled by [2]
is connected to a leaf node of probability .226. The
rule generated by this can be seen in Figure 4. Figure
5 shows the branch [3][4][6] converted to rules.
The resulting ctree can be used to give a
prediction of whether or not a given snapshot is
insecure by following the tree nodes until a leaf node
is encountered and then comparing the confidence
values against a pre-specified threshold. If the values
are greater than the threshold, the snapshot being
checked is most likely insecure. Otherwise the
snapshot is considered secure. We test a variety of
thresholds in Section 6.
We chose to use a ctree because we wanted to
create a set of rules to determine whether or not a
user is insecure rather than to have a predictive model
which would require input data to make an evaluation
of whether or not the user is actually in an insecure
situation. This approach was chosen to prevent users
from needing to constantly poll a trained model to
determine if their data is insecure. Ctrees are also
more resistant to noise. Any data points that fall
outside of the insecure clusters cannot affect the
cluster so the rules do not change. The only way to
break up a cluster is to have a significant number of
safe points to be plotted inside of the cluster, which
would cause the integrity of the cluster to come into
question anyway.

[1]
|
|
|
|
|
|

root
[2] Speed <= 10.3458: 0.226
[3] Speed > 10.3458
|
[4] Temperature <= 50
|
|
[5] Heart.Rate <= 140: 0.119
|
|
[6] Heart.Rate > 140: 0.234
|
[7] Temperature > 50: 0.191

Figure 3: Ctree format

<Policy>
<Device id="All">
<Rule>
<Type>Speed</Type>
<Op>LE</Op>
<value>10.3458</value>
<priority>.226</priority>
</Rule>
</Device>
</Policy>

Figure 4: Sample XML Rule

<Policy>
<Device id="All">
<Rule>
<Type>Speed</Type>
<Op>GT</Op>
<Cond>and</Cond>
<value>10.3458</value>
<priority></priority>
</Rule>
<Rule>
<Type>Temperature</Type>
<Op>LE</Op>
<Cond>and</Cond>
<value>50</value>
</Rule>
<Rule>
<Type>HeartRate</Type>
<Op>GT</Op>
<value>140</value>
<priority>.234</priority>
</Rule>
</Device>
</Policy>

Figure 5: Combined Rules from Ctree
A ctree is a not a traditional decision tree. It has
all of the advantages and disadvantages of a
traditional decision tree, but the features are selected
using statistical inferences at each step to make a
reasonable educated guess for the features it chooses,
as opposed to the traditional algorithm which guesses
which dimension to divide on at each level, then
checks its accuracy and retries as needed. This speeds

1407

up the training time, while retaining the same level of
accuracy.
Once the model has been trained and the tree has
been created, the tree is iterated over using a
traditional depth-first search algorithm. At each leaf
node, we get a certainty from 0-1 for the decision
present in that branch. If the certainty is high enough
and the decision is 1, the path is translated to an
intermediate language that we have designed for the
purpose of representing a set of conditions which
must all be true for a decision to be made. The lower
bound of certainty is determined beforehand based on
the risk we are willing to allow our users to take. This
value can be adjusted by the user from within the app
as needed. We look at optimal values from our initial
tests in Section 6.
The resulting language is then parsed according to
the original XML rule schema specified in [15] that
works within the existing app. An example of the
algorithm output can be seen in Figure 3. Each line is
parsed by the algorithm individually, then turned into
a rule. In the case of the tree in Figure 3, this means
creating a rule based around Speed first, then taking
both branches. The left branch is a leaf node, which
gives us the rule seen in Figure 4. The right branch
leads to two temperature options, one of which has
additional children. An example of one of these
completed branches can be seen in Figure 5.
After parsing, the rules are stored in a database on
the web server. When a request is made to the
service, the list of rules is returned to the requester.
This allows users to get updated rules at their
convenience. As previously stated, the tree and, thus,
the rules are resistant to noise, so the integrity of the
rules is preserved regardless of how long the user
reports snapshots without receiving the latest update.

5.2. Cloud-based Approach
The previous approach required the app to be
periodically updated to reflect potential insecure
environments by pushing the rules to the app. An
alternative approach is to poll a web service to
determine if the current state is insecure. In this
method, snapshots are sent to the Microsoft Azure
cloud where the Machine Learning studio is used to
deploy an algorithm to determine whether or not an
environment is insecure. Because of the cloud nature
of the algorithm, it can use snapshots that it receives
to continue to learn new, potentially insecure
environments constantly, adding and retraining on
each new snapshot that it receives.
The more simplistic architecture of this approach
can be seen in Figure 6.

Figure 6: Cloud-based Architecture
Using Azure ML studio, we trained a Decision
Forest Regression model to evaluate a set of
snapshots to determine how likely each snapshot is to
be from an insecure environment. The Decision
Forest Regression algorithm was chosen because it is
similar in function to the methods used in the rulebased approach, is considered to have good accuracy,
and is fairly fast to train. This is because the
regression algorithm uses multiple decision trees, all
trained concurrently, which results in a model that
aggregates over all the trees to find a Gaussian
distribution close to the distribution of all the trees
taken individually. Ideally, these results could be
taken from Azure ML Studio and converted into rules
in much the same way as the rule-based approach.
However, Azure ML Studio does not support the
retrieval of the tree, preventing us from taking the
results and converting them to a series of rules. Azure
ML Studio makes it very simple to create a web
service to handle individual requests for data to be
scored, allowing us to use the system to evaluate
snapshots as they are generated by a user.
Azure ML Studio requires a CSV file for input,
which allowed us to use the same file to train this
model as was used in the rule-based approach. Unlike
the rule-based approach, Azure ML Studio requires
data to use for testing the model and requires the
output of the algorithm to be in CSV format.
The web service takes in a snapshot and reports
whether or not the snapshot is insecure, with a
certainty ranging from 0 to 1 which represents how
likely the algorithm thinks the snapshot is insecure.
To train the web service, we uploaded a training CSV
file. This file is automatically parsed by Azure ML
Studio into an internal format that Azure ML Studio
uses. This data is then fed into a tuning module which
takes the machine learning algorithm and trains a
model. The resulting model is then deployed via
another web service, as seen in Figure 7. This service
takes the model and compares it with the input from
the web, outputting the result to the requester. Azure
ML Studio requires that a sample set of snapshots is
included so that it knows the format the model is
trained on, and this is included with snapshots2.csv.
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Cloud-Based

0
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% Correct

To evaluate our solution, we trained both machine
learning approaches on the same set of one hundred
thousand generated snapshots. The trained models
were then tested against an additional one hundred
thousand generated snapshots, and scored at different
levels of confidence. To start, we trained each model
on a base set of snapshots which had predefined
clusters. These clusters were arbitrarily chosen, but
would appear in a real life setting. The generated
training set had a 10% chance that every snapshot
would be insecure. For each snapshot that was within
a cluster range, the chance was raised to at most 55%.
We feel that this approximates the type of data we
would get from an initial set of security conscious
users.
The results from this initial training set can be
seen in Table 1a. Our test set, which consisted of an
additional one hundred thousand snapshots, was then
scored by both learning algorithms. In the rule-based
approach, we checked how often the rules would
trigger based on the confidence values we set as a
threshold. We are able to achieve fairly stable results
with confidences between 25% and 50% on both
algorithms, though the rule-based approach provides
slightly lower values for all confidences. This implies
both learning algorithms are accurate. Note that, at
0%, when all locations are considered insecure, the
learning algorithm is still correct 38.8% of the time
on both algorithms. This is because the scored data
set had around 38.8% of the snapshots generated as
being insecure.
After the initial training set, we generated a new
set of training and test data, each with one hundred
thousand (100,000) snapshots, which introduced two

Table 1. (a) Initial Training Set Results
(b) New Cluster Results
% Confident

6. Evaluation

Rule-Based

Similar to the rule-based approach, this model
predicts if a snapshot given to it is insecure by
checking if its confidence in that choice is above a
specified threshold. We test a variety of thresholds in
Section 6.

Cloud-Based

Figure 7: Employing Web Services

new clusters into the data. The first based on location
and the second based on temperature. The addition of
these two new clusters raised the total percentage of
the insecure environments to 48.9%. This simulated
additional attackers appearing after the initial
training, showing resilience in the training model and
the ability of the system to learn new clusters as they
arise.
The results of this dataset can be seen in Table 1b.
Again, we see the best results from confidences
between 25% and 50%, and a lower accuracy from
the rule-based approach. While both performed well
at 50% confidence, the cloud-based service
outperformed by 1.6-12.9%. This is most likely
because of the choice of the decision forest
regression as the training model, as this model is
fairly accurate.

48.9
68.9
75.8
67.9
52.1
48.9
80.3
80.2
67.7
65

7. Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we extended the functionality of
previous research on our existing mobile application
which prevents Bluetooth communication between a
base station and a device in an insecure environment.
We introduce a system that promotes the use of two
machine learning algorithms, trained on simulated
crowdsourced data, to predict if a user is in an
insecure environment. We found that both machine
learning algorithms were accurate, with the rulebased method being accurate up to 80% and the
cloud-based method being accurate up to 81.6%.
Both options allow for increased security in
potentially insecure environments.
This method could be implemented by device
manufacturers and application creators using
preexisting machine learning packages and cloud
services. Similar to WAVE’s need for modified street
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maps, it would require modification only as new
sensors were configured on wearables and how the
data was formatted. The app creators could determine
how often to retrain the models based on their
security needs, which might provide a competitive
advantage. The main limitation for a third-party app
is whether device manufacturers are willing to allow
developers access to what the wearable
communicates, which could restrict how the device
can be adapted.
Future work will focus on both improving the
machine learning algorithms and increasing the
features which can be learned on. Additionally, we
would like to begin testing our app with a small user
base to see if our generated dataset is similar to the
real world data that users would generate. Since our
app relies on users to be aware of the locations and
situations where they are actually insecure, we plan
to analyze how often these users are correct. An
important consideration may be to identify if there
are other factors that can be assessed to automatically
detect insecure environments that users are in and
provide information on a more public scale.
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